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1 Introduction
During the last decade, a number of important industries experienced consolidation
by horizontal mergers. A prominent example is the rapid succession of mergers in
the oil industry from 1998 to 2001. Crude oil is a rather homogeneous good which
is produced by a small number of ﬁrms with diﬀerent unit costs. We argue that
the merger formation in this industry can be explained as a result of cooperative
decisions taken in order to realize eﬃciency eﬀects. Previous theoretical analyses
of merger activities focused on the issue of concentration, whereas explanations of
eﬃciency eﬀects are still rare. By accounting for asymmetries in merger participants’
unit costs, we are able to show that the hunt for gains in eﬃciency is the driving
force behind merger activities. Hence, our study contributes to the literature on
endogenous asymmetric merger formation.
In line with the seminal papers by Salant et al. (1983), Deneckere, Davidson (1985),
Farrell, Shapiro (1990), and Rodrigues (2001), a large part of the literature assumes
symmetric ﬁrms. However, the dependence of the post-merger market structure
on the extent of prior asymmetry is an important result of some recent analy-
ses (see, e.g. Barros 1998, B¨ ockem 2001, Faul´ ı-Oller 1997, 2002, Tombak 2002).
Tombak (2002) analyzes sequential mergers of heterogeneous ﬁrms resulting from
a Nash-bargaining process where, despite of diﬀerences in their eﬃciency, poten-
tial merger partners have equal bargaining power. Faul´ ı-Oller (2002) focuses on
the welfare eﬀect of mergers, whereas our aim is to explain the post-merger market
structure. Faul´ ı-Oller (2000) considers a model of two eﬃcient ﬁrms sequentially
bidding for rivals using inferior technologies. Mergers between the less eﬃcient
ﬁrms, however, are excluded by assumption. In contrast, our paper does not restrict
attention to mergers initiated by technologically advanced ﬁrms. Barros (1998) ana-
lyzes endogenous merger formation in a homogeneous market with three asymmetric
ﬁrms. Our model builds on Barros’ (1998) triopoly model. However, we depart from
his approach in two important ways and hence obtain some novel results. Firstly,
we consider a pre-merger market with four ﬁrms allowing for a more sophisticated
analysis of the process of merger formation. Secondly, we employ the core as sug-
gested by Horn, Persson (2001a) as a cooperative equilibrium concept in order to
endogenously explain merger formation.
Most mergers are a result of strategic considerations of ﬁrms competing in oligopo-
listic markets. The prospective partners usually communicate freely about contract
terms and can legally enforce the reached agreements. Although the conditions of
the merger are negotiated and the contract on the merger is binding, traditional3
models assume that a merged entity must be stable even if participants act non-
cooperatively (e.g. Kamien, Zang 1990, B¨ ockem 2001). This assumption seems
restrictive except in the case of an acquisition of a rival ﬁrm. It neglects the fact
that the owners of the merging ﬁrms are free to negotiate any division of combined
proﬁts. In our opinion, formation of mergers in the oil industry is better characte-
rized by a model of cooperative merger decisions. Thus, applying solution concepts
of cooperative game theory can oﬀer new insights into the pattern of mergers and
the resulting market structure. At the same time, ﬁrms contemplating a merger
must consider the inﬂuence of their decisions on product-market competition. Until
recently, however, models of coalition formation were not suitable to analyze such
settings. Earlier studies investigated the formation and internal structure of coali-
tions using arbitrary assumptions on the behavior of outsiders. Only few models
explicitly consider the external spillover eﬀects of coalition formation on outsiders.
Initially, these studies were restricted to symmetric participants (see, Bloch 1995,
1997). A large part of the literature on cooperative game theory analyzes coalition
formation in contexts where participants’ costs decrease in the size of their coali-
tion (see, Bloch 2002 for an excellent survey of this line of models). If asymmetries
are permitted, tractability is imposed by additional simplifying assumptions. A re-
cent example is the model by Belleﬂamme (2000) which restricts the number of
coalitions to two if players are asymmetric. Espinosa, Inarra (2000) apply the equi-
librium concept of stable sets in order to predict the number of competitors in the
post-merger market structure. They assume symmetric ﬁrms which share ﬁxed costs
of production in case of a merger. In their model, mergers depend on economies of
scale. Horn, Persson (2001a,b), in contrast, follow Barros (1998) by assuming that
the coalitions use the technology of the most eﬃcient participant. They suggest an
extension of the traditional concept of the core using the idea of a partition function
as originally developed by Thrall, Lucas (1963). This approach proves to be suitable
to model the formation of mergers in oligopolies.
Our paper applies the core concept in the formulation by Horn, Persson (2001a)
to analyze the recent merger activities in the oil industry which is characterized
by cost and size asymmetries between competitors. We conclude that diﬀerences
in the size of ﬁrms determine the post-merger market structure. Due to initial
size diﬀerences, the free rider eﬀect as discussed by Selten (1973) and Salant et
al. (1983) is outweighed by eﬃciency gains if these diﬀerences are not negligible.
Hence, merger activities result in a market structure with the highest permitted
degree of concentration. If cost diﬀerences are small, eﬃciency gains are decisive.
Merger partners are very asymmetric so that only the best technologies are used
after the merger formation. This also holds if several ﬁrms have access to the best4
technology. If asymmetries are large, the least eﬃcient ﬁrm produces only a small
quantity. Hence, its inclusion in a merger deal does not result in a signiﬁcant output
reduction. With large asymmetries, the more eﬃcient ﬁrms merge, whereas the
least eﬃcient one remains as a small independent competitor. The results from
our theoretical model coincide with the empirical evidence in the oil industry where
smaller and less eﬃcient ﬁrms were acquired by large, well-run competitors.
The crude oil market experienced considerable concentration in recent years. Merger
formation predominantly involved ﬁrms of major importance in exploration and
production. Costs of crude oil production depend on the accessibility of oil reservoirs
and hence diﬀer considerably between the competitors. By merging, ﬁrms gained
access to new production sites and technologies. We argue that the merger formation
resulted from ﬁrms’ quest to gain a larger market share by reducing production costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the market
conditions and the mega-mergers in the oil industry from 1998 to 2001. Section 3
presents a cooperative game-theoretic model which is applied to analyze this merger
formation. Section 4 presents our conclusions concerning the equilibrium market
structure resulting from these endogenously derived merger decisions. We compare
our results with those of earlier work in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Recent Mergers in the World Oil Industry
Before we turn to the details of our theoretical model, we describe the most im-
portant features of the international oil market and the sequence of mergers that
occurred from 1998 to 2001.
2.1 The Structure of the Oil Market
More than half of the crude oil volume is traded internationally. Crude oil exploita-
tion is a global business, whereas technical factors of reﬁning and distribution have
led to a segmentation into regional markets (see, Weston 2002, p. 70). The upstream
business of production and distribution is rather lucrative whereas the downstream
activities of reﬁning and retailing are subject to ﬁerce competition oﬀering only small
proﬁt margins. Our study focuses on competition in crude oil extraction. The oil
industry consists of ﬁrms with a large variety of scope and organizational structure5
ranging from huge vertically integrated companies engaged in exploitation, reﬁning
and marketing, to specialized oil service ﬁrms, local reﬁneries and independent gas
stations. The vertical structure of the companies, however, has no signiﬁcant im-
pact on competition in crude oil exploration and production and will therefore be
neglected in our theoretical analysis.
Oil exploration and production is dominated by a top group of privately owned
companies and a number of large ﬁrms owned by oil-producing countries, e.g. Saudi
Aramco of Saudi Arabia or Petrobras of Brazil. 95.7% of the oil reserves in posses-
sion of the 20 largest companies are controlled by governments. Only the remaining
4.3% are in private hands. Hence, competition for easily accessible oil deposits is
especially ﬁerce among the private ﬁrms. Due to diﬀerences in the accessibility, oil
lifting costs as well as exploration and development expenditures vary signiﬁcantly
depending on the region of origin. In contrast, quality diﬀerences of crude oil from
diﬀerent reservoirs do not matter much. The production costs thus strongly de-
pend on a company’s portfolio of oil ﬁelds (see, Energy Information Administration
2002a). Consolidation of oil deposits, improvement of business practices and access
to superior technology were often achieved by mergers. As the state-run ﬁrms are
not possible merger partners, we consider only the privately owned companies.
2.2 The Succession of Horizontal Mergers
In the ﬁrst half of the 1980s, the oil industry experienced a ﬁrst wave of unsuccessful
conglomerate mergers. Simultaneously, there were several horizontal mergers as well
as sales of oil companies to ﬁrms in other industries (see, Weston 1999). The focus
of this paper is on the second period of intense merger activity. From 1998 to
2001, there was a rapid succession of mergers between some industry’s majors which
induced a strong concentration process in the top group of the petroleum industry
as illustrated in Figure 1. Only private ﬁrms participated in the mergers given in
Table 1.
It is a distinguishing feature that mergers occurred between the most and the less
eﬃcient ﬁrms. The ﬁve newly formed oil companies are among the six largest private
ﬁrms in the industry. Table 1 shows that only two competitors merged at the
same time even if the ﬁnal ﬁrm consisted of three or four formerly independent
producers. Examples for the latter are BP-Amoco merging with Arco and Phillips-
Tosco and Conoco-Gulf merging to form Conoco-Phillips. All these mergers were of
the horizontal type. As all initial ﬁrms are integrated industry majors, they can be6
Figure 1: Oil Companies Involved in the Mergers, 1998-2001
Conoco Gulf
BP Amoco Exxon Mobil Total PetroFina Arco Elf Texaco Chevron Phillips P. Tosco Conoco Gulf
BP-Amoco Exxon Mobil Total PetroFina Arco Elf Texaco Chevron Phillips P. Tosco
Exxon-Mobil Total PetroFina Arco Elf Texaco Chevron Phillips P. Tosco
Exxon-Mobil TotalFina Arco Elf Texaco Chevron Phillips P. Tosco
BP-Amoco-Arco Exxon-Mobil TotalFina Elf Texaco Chevron Phillips P. Tosco
BP-Amoco-Arco Exxon-Mobil TotalFina-Elf Texaco Chevron Phillips P. Tosco
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regarded as symmetric except in their production costs.1
Table 1: Mergers in the Oil Industry, 1998-2001
Date Participating Firms New Name
8/1998 British Petrol (BP) Amoco BP Amoco
12/1998 Exxon Mobil Exxon Mobil
12/1998 Total PetroFina TotalFina
4/1999 BP-Amoco Arco BP Amoco
7/1999 TotalFina Elf Aquitaine TotalFinaElf
10/2000 Chevron Texaco ChevronTexaco
2/2001 Phillips Tosco Phillips
5/2001 Conoco Gulf Canada Conoco
11/2001 Phillips Conoco ConocoPhillips
1 As ﬁrms’ market power is low in both the upstream as well as in the downstream markets, the
recent merger wave did not raise great concern from antitrust authorities. To prevent dominance
in certain regions or business areas, however, each of the merged companies was required to
abandon some lines of business or to sell certain assets (see, Weston 2002). Simultaneously to
these mergers of majors, consolidation occurred amongst the regional players in the USA and
Europe (see, Energy Information Administration 2002b and the business press). These“mergers
of minors”, however, had no signiﬁcant impact on the petroleum market.7
This second horizontal merger wave in the petroleum industry was triggered by a
price decline to around 10$ per barrel of crude oil in 1998. Within this second wave,
the ﬁrst mergers were used by ﬁrms to restructure their exploitation and reﬁning
businesses in order to reduce costs and remain competitive even in times of low oil
prices. Later mergers, however, were formed despite a price recovery. The dominant
objective of these deals was to realize synergy eﬀects and to increase the market
shares and, hence, the value of the ﬁrms. Indeed, contrary to many mergers in other
industries, the merger formation in the oil industry increased ﬁrms’ eﬃciency and
size. These mergers indeed raised ﬁrms’ proﬁts, with ExxonMobil by far surpassing
expectations in this respect (see, e.g. Weston 2002).
One source of increased eﬃciency due to mergers was the acquisition of oil ﬁelds
requiring similar exploitation technologies or leading to a consolidation of spheres of
interest, e.g. Exxon’s presence in Azerbaijan and Mobil’s activities in Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan. Reduction of excess capacities, elimination of parallel divisions
and adoption of the best management strategies for the diﬀerent areas of business
were stated as the most important objectives by the representatives of all majors
involved in these mergers. BP and Amoco were a good match in this respect,
BP being more eﬃcient in production and Amoco being more successful on the
downstream side of business from reﬁning to marketing. Moreover, Amoco was
strongest in the USA where BP was not very active before the merger. In contrast
to mergers in many other industries, the oil mergers indeed achieved the expected
eﬃciency gains. Another important feature of the mergers is the larger market share
of the merged ﬁrm compared to that of each previously independent company. The
size gain due to the merger oﬀers several competitive advantages. Firstly, it raises
the companies’ ﬁnancial power. Due to the fact that only a small share of the world’s
crude oil reserves are under control of private ﬁrms, competition for the discovery
and exploitation of new ﬁelds is intense. The combined ﬁnancial resources of two
formerly independent competitors enable the merged ﬁrm to invest in projects with
higher capital costs carrying higher risks. Hence, a merged entity has a larger choice
of investment projects resulting in an increased proﬁtability. A second important
beneﬁt of increased ﬁrm size is a higher lobbying power. Such political inﬂuence is
a major factor for the success of an industry where production, access to pipelines
and hence proﬁts strongly depend on political stability in countries with large oil
resources as well as on the benevolence of the local political leaders. Firms thus
strive for size not only in order to raise market shares and sales, but also to increase
investment possibilities and political inﬂuence.8
3 A Model of Asymmetric Merger Formation
We analyze the merger decisions in the world oil industry by using a stylized theo-
retical model. The assumptions of our theoretical model are set in order to reﬂect
the most important features of the world oil market. As will be shown, our results
coincide with the main characteristics of the mergers described above. Since quality
diﬀerences of crude oil seem to be of minor importance, we assume a homogeneous
market consisting of only a few ﬁrms. These ﬁrms produce with asymmetric unit
costs due to diﬀerent accessibility to their oil deposits. Eﬃciency gains due to a
merger are reﬂected by the assumption that merged entities use the most eﬃcient
technology available to the formerly independent companies.
3.1 The Pre-Merger Market
In order to keep the analysis tractable, we restrict our attention to the case of four
ﬁrm owners in the pre-merger industry. We assume that initially every owner runs
a single ﬁrm. The inverse demand function is given by p = 1 − Q, where Q is
the market output. With respect to the size asymmetry, we consider two cases. In
case 1, we assume that all ﬁrms in the pre-merger market diﬀer in their unit costs.
Asymmetric eﬃciency is characterized by a constant diﬀerence ∆ > 0 between the
ﬁrms’ unit costs.
c1 + 3∆ = c2 + 2∆ = c3 + ∆ = c4 < 1. (1)
This particular speciﬁcation is adopted from Barros (1998). The restriction on the
cost levels guarantees that all four ﬁrms are active in the pre-merger market. In order
to guarantee this, we place a restriction on the cost level of the least eﬃcient ﬁrm.
In case 2, we alternatively derive the post-merger market structure for a market
characterized by two top ﬁrms producing with low costs cl and two less eﬃcient
rivals with higher costs ch. The extent of asymmetry in the market is smaller than
in case 1 since there are only two levels of technology. Firms’ cost diﬀerences are
given by
cl + ∆ = c1 + ∆ = c2 + ∆ = c3 = c4 = ch < 1. (2)
Our distinction between the situations with four and with only two diﬀerent cost
levels sheds additional light on the importance of the extent of asymmetries for the
equilibrium market structure and is intended to prove the robustness of our results
with respect to alternative assumptions on the ﬁrms’ eﬃciency. The merger game9
consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, owners are permitted to form coalitions
until all bargaining possibilities are exhausted. In most cases, mergers are motiva-
ted by cost synergies. In order to reﬂect such eﬃciency gains, we adopt a standard
assumption of the industrial organization literature. The unit production cost of a
merged entity is the lower one of those of the merging ﬁrms. The merger decisi-
ons determine the post-merger market structure for the second stage in which the
remaining ﬁrms in the industry play a Cournot game.
3.2 The Merger Stage
Let N = (1,...,4) be the set of owners and Mw be a possible ownership market
structure where Mw is a partition of N. To account for the fact that antitrust
authorities will not give clearance to mergers raising concentration over a prespeciﬁed
threshold, we exclude mergers which would result in a monopoly and yield the
highest overall proﬁt. Therefore, 14 post-merger market structures, summarized in
Table 2, are possible candidates for an equilibrium.
Table 2: Market Structures With Four Owners
M0 = {1,2,3,4} MK = {12,34}
MA = {12,3,4} ML = {13,24}
MB = {13,2,4} MP = {14,23}
MC = {14,2,3} MQ = {1,234}
MD = {1,23,4} MR = {2,134}
ME = {1,24,3} MS = {3,124}
MG = {1,2,34} MT = {4,123}
In order to derive the post-merger equilibrium market structures, it is necessary to
introduce a relation that compares the outcomes of one market structure to another.
Following Horn, Persson (2001a), we make use of a binary dominance relation.
According to this relation, a market structure Mi is dominated by a market structure
Mj, if the owners who have the power to enforce either of the two market structures,
prefer Mj over Mi. The group of decisive owners who are able to determine the
ranking of the two market structures is deﬁned in the following way. Let Hw be a
subset of the ﬁrms in Mw, and let O(Hw) be the set of owners possessing the ﬁrms
in Hw. Then, a group of decisive owners, Dij, comprises all owners inﬂuencing the
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On the basis of the group of decisive owners, the binary dominance relation can be
deﬁned. Market structure Mj is said to dominate market structure Mi via Dij, i.e.
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k are the (combined) proﬁts of the ﬁrms in the decisive group Dij.
In some cases, the ranking of market structures can be determined by two disjoint
groups of decisive owners, e.g. MK = {12,34} Â MO = {1,2,3,4} via DOK =
{{1,2},{3,4}}. In principle, these groups might favor diﬀerent market structures.
In our model, all changes from the initial to a duopolistic market structure by
pairwise mergers beneﬁt both groups of decisive owners. Hence, the problem of
conﬂicting interests does not arise here.
The dominance relation ranks any pair of market structures. It determines the set
of equilibria contained in the core, i.e.
M \ {M
i ∈ M| M
j ∈ M such that M
i ≺ M
j}.
If all ﬁrms diﬀer in their production costs, the core is empty for a small range of size
diﬀerences. In the case of two eﬃcient and two ineﬃcient ﬁrms, however, the core
will not be empty.
3.3 The Production Stage
At the production stage, we consider a Cournot oligopoly with two, three or four
ﬁrms producing with diﬀerent unit costs, depending on the previous merger decisi-
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for any ﬁrm k in the post-merger market structure w.
In case 1, we consider a pre-merger market consisting of four asymmetric ﬁrms.
Since several possible post-merger market structures are characterized by equal unit
costs of ﬁrms, we refer to them by their cost structures. The corresponding merger
patterns are presented in Table 3.11
Table 3: Cost Structures Corresponding to the Market Structures in Case 1
Cost Structures Market Structures
{c1,c2,c3,c4} MO = {1,2,3,4}
{c1,c2,c3} MC = {14,2,3} ME = {1,24,3} MG = {1,2,34}
{c1,c2,c4} MB = {13,2,4} MD = {1,23,4}
{c1,c3,c4} MA = {12,3,4}
{c1,c2} ML = {13,24} MP = {14,23} MQ = {1,234}
MR = {134,2}
{c1,c3} MK = {12,34} MS = {3,124}
{c1,c4} MT = {4,123}
Inserting (1) and the deﬁnition d ≡ ∆/(1 − c1) into (4), we derive the proﬁts ˜ πw
k in
the diﬀerent market structures. In order to simplify the expressions, we divide all
proﬁts by (1 − c1)2/3600 and summarize the adjusted values πw
k in Table 4.
Table 4: Firms’ Proﬁts in the Market Structures in Case 1
Cost
Structure
Proﬁts of the Firms
{c1,c2,c3,c4} πO
1 = 144(1 + 6d)2, πO
2 = 144(1 + d)2,
πO
3 = 144(1 − 4d)2, πO
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34 = 225(1 − 5d)2
{c1,c2,c4} πB
13 = πD
1 = 225(1 + 4d)2, πB
2 = πD
23 = 225, πB
4 = πD
4 = 225(1 − 8d)2
{c1,c3,c4} πA
12 = 225(1 + 5d)2, πA
3 = 225(1 − 3d)2, πA












2 = 400(1 − 2d)2
{c1,c3} πK
12 = πS
124 = 400(1 + 2d)2, πK
34 = πS
3 = 400(1 − 4d)2
{c1,c4} πT
123 = 400(1 + 3d)2, πT
4 = 400(1 − 6d)2
In case 2, we analyze a market where initially a top group of two more eﬃcient
competitors faces two less eﬃcient rivals. If there are just these two levels of unit
costs as given in (2), all market structures are equivalent to one of ﬁve cost structures
as shown in Table 5.12
Table 5: Cost Structures Corresponding to the Market Structures in Case 2
Cost Structures Market Structures
{cl,cl,ch,ch} MO = {1,2,3,4}
{cl,cl,ch} MB = {13,2,4} MC = {14,2,3} MD = {1,23,4}
MG = {1,2,34} ME = {1,24,3}
{cl,ch,ch} MA = {12,3,4}
{cl,cl} ML = {13,24} MP = {14,23} MR = {134,2}
MQ = {1,234}
{cl,ch} MK = {12,34} MS = {124,3} MT = {123,4}
The ﬁrms’ proﬁts πw
k (adjusted as in case 1) in the diﬀerent market structures are
summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: Firms’ Proﬁts in the Market Structures in Case 2
Cost
Structure
Proﬁts of the Firms
{cl,cl,ch,ch} πO
1 = πO
2 = 144(1 + 2d)2
πO
3 = πO

















34 = 400(1 − 4d)2
{cl,ch,ch} πA
12 = 225(1 + 2d)2, πA
3 = πA















123 = 400(1 + d)2, πK
34 = πS
3 = πT
4 = 400(1 − 2d)213
4 Endogenous Merger Formation
Using the core concept, we are now able to solve for the post-merger equilibrium
market structures in both cases described above.
4.1 Case 1: Four Asymmetric Firms
According to (3), the post-merger market structure is determined by pairwise com-
parisons of proﬁts of decisive owners in all possible market structures as given in
Table 4. As the least eﬃcient ﬁrm 4 ceases production if the extent of asymmetry is
larger than d = 1/9 (≈ 0.111), we consider only cost diﬀerences corresponding to the
interval d ∈ (0,1/9). Comparisons of proﬁts of the decisive owners in alternative
market structures yield the binary dominance relations. Straightforward calcula-
tions show that the pre-merger market structure dominates all triopolies for cost
asymmetries larger than d = 7/183 (≈ 0.038). Moreover, the least eﬃcient duopoly
characterized by production costs {c1,c4} is stable if the extent of asymmetry is
large, corresponding to d ≥ 1/12 (≈ 0.083). The comparisons most relevant for the
determination of the equilibria are shown in the upper part of Figure 2. For reasons
of consistency, decisive owners are also referred to by their technology, i.e. their unit
costs.
Obviously, mergers do not occur as long as the extent of asymmetry is very small.
The ﬁrst dominance relation illustrated in Figure 2 shows that the pre-merger market
structure MO dominates even the duopoly of ﬁrms using the most eﬃcient techno-
logies if diﬀerences are small, d < (44 − 15
√





6)/586, 1/29 ≈ 0.034
¢
, the core is empty. As duopo-
lies, triopolies and the four-ﬁrm oligopolies cyclically dominate each other, there is
no equilibrium market structure.
For larger technology gaps, duopolies are the only candidates for an equilibrium.
The dominance relations comparing duopolies with diﬀerent cost structures are re-
presented by the seventh and the eighth lines in Figure 2. They indicate that the
“intermediate” duopolies with cost levels of {c1,c3} are dominated by the least ef-
ﬁcient duopoly characterized by {c1,c4} if costs diﬀer to a large extent, d ≥ 1/10,
and by the duopolies with the lowest unit costs, {c1,c2}, for all other values. The
duopoly consisting of ﬁrms using the best and the worst technology, respectively, is
therefore an equilibrium only for large asymmetries, d ≥ 1/10, almost forcing the
least eﬃcient ﬁrm to exit the market. Here, the core implies the market structure
MT = {4,123}. However, for an intermediate range of asymmetry, consistent with14
Figure 2: Merger Formation of Asymmetric Firms
Merger Preferences of Decisive Groups:



















0.034 0.058 0.1 0.111
values d ∈ [1/29 ≈ 0.034, 1/10), only duopolies characterized by the cost structure
{c1,c2} are candidates for equilibria. The “eﬃcient” duopoly MQ = {1,234} is an
equilibrium for intermediate asymmetries as determined by the fourth dominance
relation in Figure 2. The ﬁfth relation, {c1,c2} Âc1,c3 {c1,c2,c3}, compares the
triopolies MC = {14,2,3} and MG = {1,2,34} to the duopoly MR = {2,134}.
The decisive owners 1,3 and 4 enforce duopoly MR if the technology gap exceeds
d = 1/29. This relation also shows that the decisive owners 1 and 3 prefer the
duopoly ML = {13,24} to ME = {1,24,3} for such values of size asymmetry.
Thus, the duopolies ML, MQ and MR are equilibria for the whole range of asym-
metries covered by d ∈ [1/29,1/10). The merger changing the market structure
from MC = {14,2,3} to MP = {14,23}, however, is evaluated by the dominance
relation {c1,c2} Âc2,c3 {c1,c2,c3}. Owners 2 and 3 are decisive in this ranking. If
the extent of asymmetry is given by d ∈ [1/29, 1/17 ≈ 0.058) this duopoly is do-
minated by the triopoly MC which is itself dominated by the duopoly MR. This15
sixth dominance relation shows that the duopoly MP = {14,23} is an equilibrium
only in the smaller interval d ∈ [1/17,1/10). The equilibrium market structures
arising from the dominance relations are shown in the lower part of Figure 2. Table
7 summarizes these results.
Table 7: Equilibrium Market Structures
Size of
Asymmetry















d ∈ [1/29,1/17) ML = {13,24}, MQ = {1,234}, MR = {2,134}
d ∈ [1/17,1/10) ML = {13,24}, MQ = {1,234}, MR = {2,134}
MP = {14,23}
d ≥ [1/10,1/9) MT = {4,123}
Mergers allow the participating ﬁrms to increase their eﬃciency and size. If asym-
metries are large, ﬁrms with inferior technologies produce a small quantity. The-
refore, output contraction due to the merger would be negligible. As a conse-
quence, a merger involving the least eﬃcient ﬁrms is not attractive. For this re-
ason, MT = {4,123} is the equilibrium market structure in the interval of largest
eﬃciency and size diﬀerences. In the intermediate range of technological diﬀerences,
d ∈ [1/29,1/10), the core implies the eﬃcient duopolies as equilibria. At a ﬁrst
sight, the instability of the market structure MP = {14,23} for the lower values
of asymmetry, d ∈ [1/29,1/17), may seem surprising. However, this conclusion
conﬁrms our more general result of asymmetric merger formation for smaller dif-
ferences in eﬃciency. The merger to MR = {2,134} makes it possible to improve
technology by two ∆, the merger to MP = {14,23} only by ∆. The merger of
ﬁrms 14 and 3 is therefore more asymmetric and oﬀers a higher eﬃciency gain.2
The single step to the next eﬃcient technology by a merger to MP, in contrast,
is only proﬁtable if the extent of asymmetry is larger, corresponding to the upper
part of intermediate technological diﬀerences, d ∈ [1/17,1/10).3 If diﬀerences are
2 The merger of the independent producers 2 and 3 resulting in the market structure MP =
{14,23} involves ﬁrms with costs c2 and c3. The merger of the ﬁrm in possession of owners 1
and 4 with the single-owner ﬁrm 3 involves producers with costs c1 and c3.
3 Unfortunately, we have no access to the data of the ﬁrms’ production costs. Thus, we are not able
to compare this prediction with the cost and ownership structures of ﬁrms in the post-merger
oil market.16
very small, d < (44 − 15
√
6)/586, the output increase of the outsiders to a merger
dominates any potential eﬃciency gain. No merger occurs and the initial market
structure is the only equilibrium.
In the next subsection, we analyze the merger formation assuming size diﬀerences
of ﬁrms as discussed in case 2. As will be shown, the conclusions derived for case 1
continue to hold in a qualitative sense.
4.2 Case 2: Pairwise Symmetric Firms
We derive the equilibria resulting from merger activities by pairwise comparisons of
the proﬁts of decisive owners gained in all possible market structures summarized in
Table 6. As the proﬁts of merged ﬁrms and ﬁrms with a single owner are determined
by their technology, we refer to the diﬀerent market structures and groups of decisive
owners by their cost levels. All dominance relations are shown in the upper part,
the equilibrium market structures in the lower part of Figure 3. An ineﬃcient ﬁrm
exits the market if asymmetries are large. In order to exclude such situations, we
restrict attention to cost diﬀerences corresponding to d ∈ [0,1/3).
Figure 3: Merger Formation of Pairwise Symmetric Firms
Merger Preferences of the Decisive Groups:
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The pre-merger market structure dominates triopolies with a cost structure given
by {cl,ch,ch}. Figure 3 shows that triopolies characterized by {cl,cl,ch} are stable
merger patterns for larger cost diﬀerences, d ∈ [7/61 ≈ 0.115, 1/3). These market17
structures, however, are dominated by eﬃcient duopolies, {cl,cl}, over the relevant
range of asymmetry. However, these duopolistic structures are themselves dominated
by the initial market structures if the technology gap is lower than d = 1/15(≈
0.067). Hence, merger activities lead to a duopoly of eﬃcient ﬁrms if cost levels diﬀer
to a large extent. If technological diﬀerences are small, mergers are unproﬁtable.
The resulting equilibrium market structures are presented in Table 8.
Table 8: Equilibrium Market Structures
Size of
Asymmetry
Dominant Post-Merger Market Structures
d ∈ [0,1/15) MO = {1,2,3,4}
d ∈ [1/15,1/3) ML = {13,24}, MP = {14,23}, MR = {1,234}, MQ = {2,134}
As in the previous case, the driving force of merger formation is the reduction of
production costs. If eﬃciency diﬀerences of the initial competitors are small, mergers
are unattractive. In this case, the pre-merger market structure remains unchanged.
For an intermediate extent of asymmetry, corresponding to values of d ∈ [1/15,1/3),
the core implies duopolies using the superior technology. For large cost diﬀerences,
a market structure without mergers yields the highest proﬁts. An ineﬃcient ﬁrm,
however, exits the market if asymmetries are large, reﬂected by d ≥ 1/3. As a result,
only the technologically advanced ﬁrms remain in the market for these sizes of cost
diﬀerences. Hence, as long as the technology gap is signiﬁcant, d ∈ [1/15,1/3), a
duopoly of eﬃcient ﬁrms is the equilibrium market structure.
From the two cases considered, we obtain similar conclusions with respect to the
merger formation in the oil market. All competitors involved in the mergers produ-
ced considerable quantities in the pre-merger market. Firms’ size and cost diﬀerences
thus correspond to an intermediate range of asymmetry, d ∈ [1/29 ≈ 0.034, 1/10)
or d ∈ [1/15,1/3) in cases 1 and 2, respectively.
As predicted by the model, the ﬁrms in the oil industry have chosen asymmetric
merger partners since such deals oﬀered the largest eﬃciency gains and the largest
increase of proﬁts. Both versions of our model suggest that mergers in the oil
industry were driven by ﬁrms’ hunt for such eﬃciency gains. Furthermore, according
to the theoretical analysis, ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase due to merger formation. This is
indeed an important feature of the mergers observed in the oil industry.18
5 A Comparison with Alternative Solution Con-
cepts
Our assumptions were set to reﬂect the most important characteristics of the crude
oil market. A comparison with other theoretical work, however, is of independent
interest. From a technical point of view, our results conﬁrm Barros’ (1998) conclu-
sion that for lower size asymmetries, mergers occur between the more asymmetric
ﬁrms. Barros derives the endogenous merger decisions using the criterion of inter-
nal and external cartel stability as proposed by Selten (1973) and D’Aspremont et
al. (1983). In order to apply it to an asymmetric market, he restricts the number
of initial competitors to three. Moreover, he assumes that ﬁrms participate in a
merger as long as the outsider is not able to oﬀer a more proﬁtable alternative, that
is a larger share of proﬁts from an alternative merger. The resulting market struc-
ture, however, is not unique. In order to achieve uniqueness of the solution, Barros
imposes an additional criterion selecting the merger with the largest internal gain
as the equilibrium merger pattern. Moreover, the criteria of internal and external
stability are applicable only to the triopoly case where mergers involving two ﬁrms
are trivially externally stable if merger to monopoly is forbidden by antitrust laws.
This analysis, however, cannot be extended to markets with more than three ﬁrms.
Hence, the choice of this stability criterion considerably limits the applicability of
the Barros model.
The extension of the core concept as suggested by Horn, Persson (2001a) permits
an application to our example of an asymmetric oligopoly. In contrast to Horn,
Persson (2001a,b), we are able to predict the technologies in use after the mergers
depending on the initial asymmetry. Moreover, the predictions of our model with
respect to the ownership structures of the ﬁrms in the post-merger market are quite
detailed, especially in the case of asymmetric ﬁrms. In addition, our analysis has
shown that very ineﬃcient ﬁrms are not involved in mergers if technology diﬀerences
are large. This result continues to hold in the more general model by Horn, Persson
(2001a) which assumes that merger participants obtain higher proﬁts in the case of
all mergers resulting in the most concentrated market structure allowed by cartel
laws. This assumption implies very high incentives for mergers, e.g. due to large
eﬃciency gains. Although in our model a merged entity produces with the most
eﬃcient technology of the participating ﬁrms, the eﬃciency gains from mergers are
high enough to meet this assumption only if the extent of cost diﬀerences is consid-
erable. However, our model allows us to derive the equilibrium market structures
for the whole range of cost diﬀerences. Although Horn, Persson’s (2001a) critical19
assumption is not fulﬁlled, our analysis yields the qualitatively identical results on
concentration and cost levels in the post-merger market structure.
As was argued in the introduction, merger deals are not conﬁned to oﬀering the
market value of a prospective partner as the potential outsider (the assumption
used by Kamien, Zang 1990) or the share of proﬁt leaving the initiator himself
indiﬀerent between participation in a merger or becoming an outsider (see, Bar-
ros 1998). Espinosa, Inarra’s (2000) and Thoron’s (1998) assumption that merger
partners share proﬁts equally applies only to a limited number of cases with “mer-
gers of equals”. However, even in these cases, the shares of the participating ﬁrms
are not necessarily converted one-to-one into shares of the merged entity. In the
oil industry for example, Conoco and Phillips announced a “merger of equals” (see,
Weston 2002, 70). By choosing the corresponding takeover price, any division of
proﬁts between prospective participants can be achieved in principle. The core con-
cept requires no restriction on the division of future proﬁts. Hence, it is applicable
to a broader set of merger cases, those in the oil industry included.
6 Summary and Conclusion
This paper has analyzed mergers in the world oil industry by using a stylized oligo-
poly model. In the oil market, competitors produce with diﬀerent unit costs. Firms
therefore diﬀer in their size. As mergers in this industry resulted from prolonged
bargaining over the details of the contract, we modeled merger formation as a result
of cooperative decisions. Under alternative assumptions on the size asymmetries of
pre-merger ﬁrms, we derived the following conclusions on mergers in markets with
asymmetric ﬁrms:
• Mergers lead to the maximal concentration allowed by antitrust laws.
• Mergers are driven by a hunt for size: Firms strive to increase their market
share by the cost reduction attainable through a merger.
• For a large range of moderate cost diﬀerences, merged ﬁrms consist of rather
asymmetric partners. If the extent of asymmetry is extreme, producers with
inferior technology remain independent competitors in the post-merger market.
The results of our model are in accordance with the empirical evidence on the mega-
mergers in the oil industry. In this industry, concentration due to merger formation20
was considerable. As predicted by the model, eﬃcient ﬁrms merged with less eﬃ-
cient competitors. Moreover, the eﬃciency gains were realized by merger formation
raising participants’ combined market shares and proﬁts. Our model of cooperative
merger decisions in a market with asymmetric competitors reproduces these facts.
Its applicability, however, is not limited to the oil industry. Our conclusions carry
over to all oligopolistic markets where ﬁrms diﬀer in size and eﬃciency gains realized
by a merger are suﬃciently strong.21
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